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Abstract—A Context-Aware Usage CONtrol (CA-
UCON) model is an extension of the traditional UCON
model which enables adaptation to environmental changes
in the aim of preserving continuity of usage in a per-
vasive computing system. When the authorisations and
obligations requirements are met by the subject and
the object, and the conditions requirements fail due to
changes in the environment or the system context, CA-
UCON model triggers specific actions to adapt to the new
situation. Besides the data protection, CA-UCON model so
enhances the quality of services, striving to keep explicit
interactions with the user at a minimum. This paper
proposes a formal specification of the CA-UCON model in
the Calculus of Context-aware Ambients (CCA in short).
This enables formal analysis of the CA-UCON model using
the execution environment of CCA. For illustration, some
properties of the CA-UCON model are validated for a
ubiquitous learning system.
Keywords-Pervasive system, context-aware, usage con-
trol, CCA
I. INTRODUCTION
Usage CONtrol (UCON) model [6] is the latest major
enhancement of the traditional access control models
which enables mutability of subject and object at-
tributes, and continuity of control on usage of resources.
While the concept of mutability refers to the fact that
attributes are not static but does change intermittently,
continuity of access decision ensures that decision to
permit and allow access to an object is made constantly
before and during the access to an object. This access
decision is based on three key factors: authorisations,
obligations and conditions. Because of the continuity
of access decision, access permission may be revoked
as a result of changes in the environmental or system
context, regardless of whether the authorisations and
obligations requirements are met. This constitutes a
major shortcoming of the UCON model in pervasive
computing systems which constantly strives to adapt to
environmental changes so as to minimise disruptions to
the user.
Some recent works have been done to improve the
UCON model. For instance, [11] proposed a new ac-
cess control model called TUCON (Times-based Usage
Control) for prevention of digital resources abuse. In
TUCON a time variable is introduced into UCON, and
maximum times defined as consumption constraints.
This approach is easily defined in CA-UCON model by
specified the time as condition requirement. [12] pro-
posed Geography Usage Control (GEO-UCON) model
to deal with GEO DBMS access control. In GEO-
UCON a geospatial factor is added into UCON to ensure
data security in location-based services and mobile
applications. This model like the last one, can be defined
in CA-UCON model where the location can be used as
condition requirement to control the service. Moreover,
[13] extends usage control model to context-aware in
mobile computing environments. They introduced two
new components into UCON model: context and states.
The new model called ConUCON takes these new com-
ponents plus obligations on access decisions. [14] pro-
posed a new model called CUC model which replaces
the conditions component in UCON by context and
add a management module to it. The last two models
are using the context only to control the resources by
changing the condition component into context, which
is basically the UCON model can do that.
Unlike the above UCON extensions, a Context-Aware
Usage CONtrol (CA-UCON) model was proposed [1]
which enables adaptation to environmental changes in
the aim of preserving continuity of usage by triggering
specific actions to adapt to new situations. In addition to
data protection, CA-UCON model enhances the quality
of services, striving to keep explicit interactions with
the user at a minimum. This makes it more suitable
for pervasive computing systems. In this paper, we
present a formal specification of the CA-UCON model
using the Calculus of Context-aware Ambients (CCA in
short). Main features of CCA include mobility, context-
awareness and concurrency. Moreover, CCA specifica-
tions are executable, and so enables rapid prototyping.
Our main contributions are summarised as follows:
• A formal specification of CA-UCON model using
CCA is presented (Sect. IV). This enables formal
analysis of the CA-UCON model using the execu-
tion environment of CCA.
• An example of a ubiquitous learning system is
used to demonstrate how the properties of the CA-
UCON model can be validated using the execution
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environment of CCA (Sect. V).
II. OVERVIEW OF CA-UCON MODEL
A Context-Aware Usage CONtrol (CA-UCON)
model is an extension of the traditional UCON model
to enable adaptation to environmental changes in the
aim of preserving continuity of access. Indeed, when
the authorisations and obligations requirements are met
by the subject and the object, and the conditions re-
quirements fail due to changes in the environmental or
the system context, CA-UCON model triggers specific
actions to adapt to the new situation. Besides the data
protection, CA-UCON model so enhances the qual-
ity of services, keeping explicit interactions with the
user at a minimum. [6] defined the UCONABC family
core models where A stands for Authorisations, B for
oBligations and C for Conditions. We defined the CA-
UCONABD family core models where C is replaced
by D for aDaptation. So the CA-UCONA and CA-
UCONB family core models are identical to UCONA
and UCONB , respectively. The CA-UCOND family
core model comprises two models: the pre-adaptation
model CA-UCONpreD and the on-going adaptation
model CA-UCONonD.
The computational model of CA-UCON model can
be described as a Finite State Machine (FSM) depicting
how an subject’s request to access an object is handled
in the CA-UCON model. The FSM is depicted by
the graph in Figure 1, where nodes are called states
and edges are called transitions. The initial state, la-
belled initial, corresponds to state when the system
is waiting for a suject to submit a request. There are
three final states: end, when the access has successfully
terminated; denied, when the access request has been
denied; and revoked, when access permission has been
revoked during access and hence the access stopped.
The intuitive meaning of the remaining states of the
FSM can be summarised as follows: requesting, denotes
when the access request is being processed; accessing,
represents the state when the actual access is taking
place; preadapting, is the state when the system is trying
to adapt to the environmental context prior to access;
and finally onadapting, is when the system is trying to
adapt to the environmental context during access.
The transitions of the FSM are labelled with the
events (or actions) that fire them. The event tryaccess
occurs when a suject sends an access request (e.g. by
clicking a menu button). This event forces the FSM
to enter the requesting state to process that access
request. While in this state, the system can perform
updates on subject’s and object’s attributes through
preupdate events. If the authorisations, obligations and
conditions requirements are all met, the system emits
the permitaccess event and moves into the accessing
state. If for some reasons either the authorisations































Figure 1. Execution of an access request in the CA-UCON model
the sytem emits the event denyaccess and terminates
in the denied state. However, if both the authorisations
requirement and obligations requirement are met, but
the conditions requirement is not satisfied, the system
emits the preadaptaccess event and moves into the
preadapting state. In this state, specific adaptation ac-
tions, denoted by the preadapt events, are performed
in an attempt to meet the conditions requirement. If the
adaptation is successful, the permitaccess event is raised
and the system transitions into the accessing state. In
addition, a new request to access a specified alternative
object, denoted by the tryaltaccess event, may be issued
automatically by the system if the adaptation actions
fail. Otherwise the access request is simply denied when
no adaptations is possible.
When access permission is granted (see permitac-
cess event), the system transitions into the accessing
state in which the actual access takes place. During
access the system can perform updates on subject’s
and object’s attributes via onupdate events. If dur-
ing access either the authorisations requirement or the
obligations requirement is not met, the sytem emits
the event revokeaccess and terminates in the revoked
state. However, if both the authorisations requirement
and obligations requirement are continuously met, but
the conditions requirement fails, the system raises the
onadaptaccess event and moves into the onadapting
state. In this state, specific adaptation actions, denoted
by the onadapt events, are performed in an attempt
to meet the conditions requirement. If the adaptation
is successful, the continueaccess event is raised and
the system moves back into the accessing state. In the
effort to enhance the qualility of service even further,
the system might issue an implicit request to access
a specified alternative object through the tryaltaccess
event, when the adaptation actions fail. In the worst case
when no adaptations is possible, the access permission
is simply revoked and the access stopped at once.
When an access terminates successully via the en-
daccess event, the system moves into the end state and
eventually performs updates on subject’s and object’s
attributes through postupdate events. Due to the space
limtation, we refer the reader to [1] for more details.
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III. OVERVIEW OF CCA
CCA was proposed in [5] as a process calculus for
modelling mobile systems that are context-aware. It
builds upon a previous calculus known as Mobile Ambi-
ents [9] whilst introducing new ideas. It enables ambient
(e.g., software, devices, locations) and processes to have
an awareness of the conditions and context in which
they are executed. The resulting process calculus is
flexible and powerful, emphasising context awareness
and mobility. An ambient is an abstraction of a bounded
place where computation happens. An ambient can be
mobile, and can communicate with peers and can be
nested inside an other ambient. In this section, we
present the syntax and the informal semantics of the
calculus. Due to the space limit, we refer the reader to
[5] for the formal semantics of CCA. We shall define
4 syntactic categories with CCA. These are: processes
P , capabilities M , locations α and context expressions
κ. Names are always written in lower case letters e.g.
n, x and y etc. A list of names is denoted by y˜ and |y˜|
represents the size of the list.
Table I
SYNTAX OF CCA
P,Q := 0 | P |Q | n[P ] | (νn) P | !P | κ?M.P
M := in n | out | α x〈y˜〉 | α (y˜) | α 〈y˜〉
α := ↑ | n ↑ | ↓ | n ↓ | :: |n :: | 
κ := true | • | n = m | ¬κ | κ1| κ2
| κ1 ∧ κ2 | new n, κ | ⊕ κ | Gκ
Processes: The process 0 terminates immediately.
If two processes P and Q are running in parallel, this
is denoted by P |Q. To limit the scope of a name, the
following notation is used: (νn) P , indicating that the
scope of n is limited to P . The replication !P denotes
a process that can recreate a copy of itself whenever
needed, i.e. !P ≡ P |!P . The process n[P ] represents
an ambient named n whose behaviour is described by
the process P .
A context expression κ denotes the situation that must
be met by the environment of the executing process. The
context-guarded prefix k?M.P is a process that waits
until the environment satisfies the context-expression κ,
then executes the capability M and continues like the
process P .
Locations: The location α can be ‘↑ ’ which
indicates any parent, ′n ↑′ for a definite parent ambient
named n, ‘↓’ which denotes any child, and ‘n ↓’ for a
definite child ambient named n, the ′ ::′ which refers to
any sibling, and ′n ::′ signifies a specific sibling ambient
named n. The symbol  (empty string) refers to the
current ambient.
Capabilities: There are two mobility capabilities
defined in CCA [5], which make it possible for an
ambient to move in its environment. These are ’in’ and
’out’. An ambient can execute the capability ’in n’
to move into a sibling ambient named n, and the
capability out allows an ambient to move out of its
parent ambient. Ambients are able to send and receive
messages. Using the capability α 〈y˜〉 an ambient is able
to send a list of names y˜ to a location α. An ambient can
execute the capability α (y˜) to receive in the variables
in y˜ a set of names from a location α.
Context expression: In CCA, a context is modelled
as a process with a hole in it. The hole (denoted by
) in a context represents the position of the process
that context is the context of. For example, suppose a
system is modelled by the process P | n[Q | m[R | S]].
So, the context of the process R in that system is
P | n[Q | m[ | S]], and that of the ambient named
m is P | n[Q | ]. Properties of contexts are called
context expressions (CE in short).
The CE true holds for all context. A CE n = m
holds if the names n and m are lexically identical. The
CE • holds solely for the hole context, i.e. the position
of the process evaluating that context expression. Propo-
sitional operators such as negation (¬) and conjunction
(∧) expand their usual semantics to context expressions.
A CE κ1|κ2 holds for a context if that context is a
parallel composition of two contexts. A CE n[κ] holds
for a context if that context is an ambient named n such
that κ holds inside that ambient. A CE ⊕κ holds for a
context on the condition that the context has a child
context for which κ holds. For a CE Gκ to hold for a
context there must be a sub-context present, somewhere
in that context, for which κ holds. The operator G is
known as somewhere modality while ⊕ is known as
spatial next modality.
IV. FORMALISING THE CA-UCON MODEL IN CCA
In this section, we give a formalisation of the CA-
UCON model using mathematical notation of CCA.
We model each non-terminal state of the automaton
in Figure 1 as an ambient. The behaviour of the user
that initiates an access request is also represented by an
ambient named subject. In addition, specific ambients
are used to check the authorisation, obligation and
condition requirements. So the formal specification of
the CA-UCON model is given by the following CCA
process:
subject [Psubject ] | requesting [Prequesting ]
| accessing [Paccssing ] | preadapting [PpreD ]
| onadapting [PonD ] | checkPreA[PpreA]
| checkPreB [PpreB ] | chechPreC [PpreC ]
| checkOnA[PonA] | checkOnB [PonB ]
| checkOnC [PonC ]
The specifications of these ambients are detailed in
the following subsections. First, we give in Table II
a convention of notations used in these specifications;
these include constants and variables symbols.
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ENDED_SUCCESSFULLY usage ended successfully
Variables
Notation Description values
s user id 201,202, 203
o object id lect1, tut3, test4










This ambient is responsible for submitting the access
request to the requesting ambient; it then waits for the
reply to this access request, whether permit or deny. The
user eventually ends the usage by sending the message
END_USAGE to the accessing ambient. This behaviour
is modelled as follows:
Psubject =̂ !requesting :: 〈s, o, r〉.requesting :: (reply, o, r).{
(reply = PERMIT )?accessing :: (x, o, r).0
| accessing :: 〈END_USAGE, o, r〉.0
}
where s is the user id, o the object id and r the access
right requested.
B. Requesting Ambient
This ambient handles all the access requests sent by
the subject in order to access an object. It receives
an access request from the subject ambient and checks
the preauthorisation, preobligation and precondition by
sending the access request to the checkPreA, checkPreB
and checkPreC ambients, respectively. If the preA and
preB and preC are true (i.e. 1), the subject is permitted
to access the requested object. But if preA (or preB)
is not true (i.e. 0), the reply DENYA (or DENYB
respectively) is sent to the subject. However, if preA
and preB are true but preC is false, the request is sent
to the checkPreD ambient in order to adapt to the new
situation if possible. The reply DENYC is sent to the
subject if the adaptation fails (i.e. preD = 0). This
behaviour is modelled as follows:
Prequesting =̂ ! :: (s, o, r).checkPreA :: 〈s, o, r〉.
checkPreA :: (preA).
(preA = 1)?checkPreB :: 〈s, o, r〉.
checkPreB :: (preB).
(preB = 1)?checkPreC :: 〈s, o, r〉.
checkPreC :: (preC ).
(preC = 1)?subject :: 〈PERMIT , o, r〉.
preUpdate :: 〈s, o, r〉.preUpdate :: ().
accessing :: 〈s, o, r〉.0
| (preC = 0)?preadapting :: 〈s, o, r〉.
preadapting :: (preD).{
(preD = 1)?subject :: 〈PERMIT , o, r〉.
preUpdate :: 〈s, o, r〉.
preUpdate :: ().accessing :: 〈s, o, r〉.0
| (preD = 0)?subject :: 〈DENYC , o, r〉.0
}

| (preB = 0)?subject :: 〈DENYB, o, r〉.0

| (preA = 0)?subject :: 〈DENYA, o, r〉.0

C. Accessing Ambient
This ambient is responsible for continuously control-
ling all the permitted access requests that it receives
from the requesting ambient. This is achieved through
sending the access request to the checkOnA, checkOnB
and checkOnC ambient, and receiving the reply in the
following variables: onA, onB and onC. If onA or onB is
false, the reply REVOKEA or REVOKEB is sent to the
subject, respectively. However, if onA and onB are true
but onC is false, the access request is sent to checkOnD,
whereupon it receives the parameter onD; if this is true,
the subject will be permitted to continue to access the
object until the user ends the usage. Otherwise, the reply
REVOKEC is sent to the subject ambient and the usage
terminates immediately. This behaviour is modelled as
follows:
Paccessing =̂ ! :: (s, o, r).
checkOnA :: 〈s, o, r〉.checkOnA :: (onA).
(onA = 1)?checkOnB :: 〈s, o, r〉.checkOnB :: (onB).
(onB = 1)?checkOnC :: 〈s, o, r〉.
checkOnC :: (onC ).
(onC = 1)?onUpdate :: 〈s, o, r〉.
onUpdate :: ().accessing :: 〈s, o, r〉.0
| (onC = 0)?onadapting :: 〈s, o, r〉.
onadapting :: (onD).{
(onD = 1)?onUpdate :: 〈s, o, r〉.
onUpdate :: ().accessing :: 〈s, o, r〉.0
| (onD = 0)?subject :: 〈REVOKEC , o, r〉.0
}

| (onB = 0)?subject :: 〈REVOKEB, o, r〉.0

| (onA = 0)?subject :: 〈REVOKEA, o, r〉.0

| subject :: (x).postUpdate :: ().postUpdate :: 〈s, o, r〉.
postUpdate :: (x).subject :: 〈ENDED_SUCCESSFULLY , o, r〉.0
D. Preadapting Ambient
When the precondition does not hold, the request-
ing ambient forwards the access request to this am-
bient which then attempts to adapt to the context by
performing specific actions. In addition, it is able to
issue an alternative request which is appropriate to the
current situation. Otherwise, the access request is simply
denied, when no adaptation is possible. This behaviour
is modelled as follows:
PpreD =̂ !requesting :: (s, o, r).P.requesting :: 〈preD〉.0
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where P stands for the pre-adaptation actions or alter-
native request, which must be done by the preadapting
ambient. The decision is calculated in the variable
preD and sent to the requesting ambient. The actual
specification of the process P is application dependent.
E. Onadapting Ambient
When the oncondition is false during the access, the
accessing ambient forwards the access request to the
onadapting ambient which attempts to adapt to the new
situation in order to maintain continuity of usage of
the resource. Like the requesting ambient, it is capable
of issueing an alternative request depending on the
context. If no adaptation is possible, the access is simply
revoked. This behaviour is modelled as follows:
PonD =̂ accessing :: (s, o, r).P.accessing :: 〈onD〉.0
where P stands for on-adaptation actions or alternative
request, which must be performed by the onadapting
ambient. The decision is calculated in the variable onD
and sent to the accessing ambient.
F. CheckPreA Ambient
This ambient receives an access request from the
requesting ambient and checks whether the pre-
authorisation requirements are met by the subject. It
then sends the decision preA to the requesting ambient.
This behaviour is achieved as follows:
PpreA =̂ !requesting :: (s, o, r).P.requesting :: 〈preA〉.0
where the process P models the pre-authorisation
requirements, which again are application dependent.
G. CheckPreB Ambient
This ambient receives an access request from the re-
questing ambient and checks whether the preobligation
requirements are met by the subject. Then, it sends the
decision preB to the requesting ambient. This behaviour
is achieved as follows:
PpreB =̂ !requesting :: (s, o, r).P.requesting :: 〈preB〉.0
where the process P models the preobligation require-
ments.
H. CheckPreC Ambient
This ambient receives an access request from the
requesting ambient and checks whether the precondition
requirements are met by the environment. Then, it
sends the decision preC to the requesting ambient. This
behaviour is achieved as follows:
PpreC =̂ !requesting :: (s, o, r).P.requesting :: 〈preC〉.0
where the process P represents the precondition re-
quirements.
I. CheckOnA Ambient
This ambient plays similar role for onauthorisation
requirements like the checkPreA ambient for preautho-
risation requirements. The decision whether the onau-
thorisation requirements are met is returned to the
accessing ambient via the variable onA. This behaviour
is specified as follows:
PonA =̂ !accessing :: (s, o, r).P.accessing :: 〈onA〉.0
where the process P models the onauthorisation re-
quirements.
J. CheckOnB Ambient
Similarly to the checkOnA ambient, this ambient
plays the same role for onobligation requirements as
the checkPreB ambient for preobligation requirements.
The decision whether the onobligation requirements are
met is returned to the accessing ambient via the variable
onB. This behaviour is specified as follows:
PonB =̂ !accessing :: (s, o, r).P.accessing :: 〈onB〉.0
where P represents the onobligation requirements.
K. CheckOnC Ambient
As for this ambient, it receives an access request
from the accessing ambient and checks whether the on-
condition requirements are met by the environment. The
decision is sent to the accessing ambient in the variable
onC. This behaviour is specified as follows:
PonC =̂ !accessing :: (s, o, r).P.accessing :: 〈onC 〉.0
where the process P models the on-condition require-
ments.
V. VALIDATION
In this section, we illustrate how CA-UCON model
properties can be validated using the execution envi-
ronment of CCA. This is done via an example of a
ubiquitous learning system (u-learning).
A. Example: a u-learning system
A u-learning system takes into account the context of
the learners, their devices, and the environment in order
to provide them services such as u-lectures, u-tutorials
and u-tests. It enables learners to use their portable
devices, such as smart phones, laptops and PDAs, to
connect wirelessly to various wireless networks, such
as Wi-Fi spots, WLANs and 3G terminals, in order to
access u-learning services anytime, anywhere. The u-
learning system delivers the content of services to the
learner as appropriate and adaptable content, based on
the context of use (e.g. user devices, available band-
width, and user activities). These services are available
in three formats: text, audio and video. The policies of
u-learning system are presented as follows:
• The u-learning system considers the context along
with the type of requested u-service before and
during the access request. Therefore, the u-learning
system would allow the learner to access only one
type of u-service format if the context of the learner
were to be detected as ’driving’, which would be
the audio format. However, if the context of the
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learner were ’not driving’, s/he would be allowed
to access any u-service format.
• The location context of the learner is classified as
private or public. The public context is defined as
learners being in a location where making noise
is not permitted, such as in a library, seminar or
lecture hall. On the other hand, the private context
denotes that the learners are in a location where
making noise is permitted, such as in a cafe or
at home. The only u-service format allowed for
a learner in a public context is the text format.
However, the system permits access to all the dif-
ferent u-service formats when the learner context
is detected as private.
• The available memory on the user’s device is
also important. Each u-service format requires a
different amount of space for memory space in
order to facilitate access. If the learner requests a u-
service in the video format, the available memory
of the device must be more than 5MB for access
to be permitted. However, the available memory
of the device must only be more than 2MB if an
audio is requested, and more than 1MB for a text.
B. Executing Scenarios
In following paragraphs, we design two scenarios
and execute them in order to validate some properties
of CA-UCON model in u-learning system. The two
main properties are safety property and liveness
property:
Scenario 1: The property to validate in this sce-
nario is : " if the pre-authorization, pre-obligation
and pro-condition requirements are met at the time of
access request and on-authorization, on-obligation and
on-condition requirements are continuously hold, the
access will be successful". Suppose a learner requests to
download a u-lecture in the video format and the context
of learner is in private place and the memory capacity
of her/his mobile device is more than 5MB. The service
will be delivered to the learner by the system.
Figure 2 presents a screen shot of the execution of
Scenario 1, from which it can be seen that the subject
sends the access request to the requesting ambient (line
2). The requesting ambient receives the access request
and checks the pre-authorisation, pre-obligation and
pre-conditions pertaining to this request (lines 3-8). The
ambient checkPreC checks the context of the subject,
the memory capacity of the mobile device and the
bandwidth of the network before access. In this case,
all the requirements before the access are met and the
access is permit to the service(lines 16). Moreover, the
requesting ambient sends the access request to access-
ing ambient to check on-authorisation, on-obligation
and on-conditions pertaining to this request, and all
requirements are hold during the access (lines 22-27). In
Figure 2. Execution of Scenario1
line(33) The subject ended the access successfully by
sending this message END_USAGE to the accessing
ambient.
Scenario 2: the property to validate in this scenario
is : " if the one of the pre-authorization or pre-obligation
requirements are not met before the access is permit, the
access will be denied by the system". Suppose a learner
requests to download a u-lecture in the video format
and the context of learner is in private place and the
memory capacity of her/his mobile device is more than
5MB. However, the pre-authorization requirements of
this access request are not met. In this case, the system
has to deny the access request.
Figure 3. Execution of Scenario 2
Figure 3 illustrates the execution of scenario 2.
The subject sends the access request containing the
subject ID, the u-lecture in the video format and the
downloading right to the requesting ambient (line 2).
The requesting ambient receives the access request and
checks the pre-authorisation pertaining to this request
(line 3). So, the pre-authorization of this request is not
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met, and finally the system denied the access request
(lines 4-5).
VI. RELATED WORK
There are many existing formal specification which
support mobility and/or context-aware, but majority of
them were not appropriated in order to model context-
aware mobile applications. For instance, one of these
formal specification is called CONAWA proposed by
[2] as calculus for applications that are context-aware,
and this formal specification is inspired by pi calculus.
The CONAWA’s syntax concentrates on constructs that
make it probable to navigate and describe via context.
Another formal specification was proposed by [3] which
is known as Bigraphs, it is a unifying framework
that used to model concurrent mobile systems, but it
does not support context-awareness. Moreover, a UML
specification of the infostation-based mLearning sys-
tem was proposed by [4]. Despite the fact that UML
specification offers a number of benefits like system
analyses utilizing assistant tools and code generation, it
has suffered from the need of formal reasoning support
which represent its limitation for the design of critical
systems. As consequence, we select CCA in order to
model a context-aware system, as it is a mathematical
notation that support mobility and context-awareness,
as well as treats those primitive constructs as first-class
citizens. However, to the best of our knowledge, none
of these formal specification or others are used to model
CA-UCON model.
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we have presented the formalisation of
a context-aware usage control in CCA. A CA-UCON
model is represented as a process and so can be executed
and analysed using the execution environment of CCA.
We have illustrated how such analysis can be done using
an example of a u-learning system. Scenarios can be
designed and executed to test various properties of the
model.
In future works, we will investigate possible en-
forcement mechanisms of the CA-UCON model in a
pervasive environment.
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